

EasyChain: An IoT-Friendly Blockchain for Robust and Energy-Efficient Authentication

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2 ABSTRACT

3 The Internet of Everything (IoE) is a bigger picture that tries to fit the Internet of Things (IoT)
4 that is widely deployed in smart applications. IoE brings people, data, processes, and things
5 to form a network that is more connected and increases overall system intelligence. Further
6 investigating the IoE can really mean creating a distributed network focusing on edge computing
7 instead of relying on the cloud. Blockchain is one of the recent distributed network technologies
8 which by structure and operations provide data integrity and security in trust-less P2P networks
9 such as IoE. Blockchain can also remove the need for central entities which is the main hurdle
10 for wide adoption of IoT in large networks. IoT “things” are resource constrained both in power
11 and computation to adopt the conventional blockchain consensus algorithms that are power
12 and compute-hungry. To solve that problem, this paper proposes EasyChain, a blockchain
13 that is robust along with running on a lightweight authentication-based consensus protocol that
14 is Proof-of-Authentication (PoAh). This blockchain based on lightweight consensus protocol
15 replaces the power-hungry transaction and block validation steps and provides ease of usage in
16 resource-constrained environments such as IoE. The proposed blockchain is designed using the
17 language Python for easy understanding of the functions and increased ease of integration into
18 IoE applications. The designed blockchain system is also deployed on a single-board computer
19 to analyze its feasibility and scalability. The latency observed in the simulated and experimental
20 evaluations is 148.89 ms which is very fast compared to the existing algorithms.

21 **Keywords:** Internet-of-Everything (IoE), IoE Security, Internet of Things (IoT), IoT-Device Security, Blockchain, Distributed Ledger,
22 Consensus Algorithm, Energy-Efficient Cybersecurity

1 INTRODUCTION

23 Many definitions were given for the Internet of Things (IoT) since the term was coined in 1999 (S.
24 P. Mohanty et al., 2020). A typical IoT architecture consists of devices that are coined as “things” that
25 are connected over a network using different Information and Communication Technologies (ICT's) and

26 perform resource-intensive operations in the cloud. Unique identification is one of the main characteristics
27 of the things along with the capability to connect to the Internet. Unique identification can either be a
28 MACID assigned to Network Interface Card (NIC) or the IP address assigned by the network to each
29 individual device that is connected. IoT architecture is being used in many applications that can range from
30 smart healthcare to industrial IoT and smart cities (Castanho et al., 2019; Corbett et al., 2018; Shahzad
31 and Kim, 2019; Xu et al., 2022; Mitra et al., 2022). **Combining these IoT networks with people and
32 processes create Internet of Everything (IoE).** In Healthcare Cyber-Physical System (H-CPS), which is a
33 very complex environment, many IoT networks are used at supply chains, medical centers, care centers, etc.
34 to continuously monitor and provide better care to patients. According to the Health Insurance Portability
35 and Accountability Act (HIPPA), such sensitive healthcare information should be handled with high data
36 privacy and security. As the number of connected devices is increasing day-to-day and implementing
37 robust security mechanisms at the expense of higher computation and power requirements is not a feasible
38 solution for IoE environments. The lack of such robust security systems in place has opened doors for
39 attackers to remotely gain unauthorized access to the systems (Mohanty et al., 2020; Alfandi et al., 2020).

40 IoT architecture is independent of the communication protocol stack such as TCP/IP and is powered
41 by many lightweight protocols which can accommodate the low bandwidth IoT requirements (Dorri
42 et al., 2017). Things in IoT are responsible for collecting the sensory data and transmitting it to the end
43 devices which typically are single-board computers (SBC) with little higher computational and storage
44 capabilities compared to things. Collection and communication of these environmental data is one of the
45 major concerns in IoT architecture and is facilitated by different middleware technologies (Moreno et al.,
46 2017). The edge layer which consists of Edge Data Centers (EDCs) will act as real-time data processing
47 units and provide emergency data processing (Zanella et al., 2014; Puthal et al., 2016; Zhaofeng et al.,
48 2020) capabilities for IoT deployments due to its decentralized nature. Several applications which include
49 military, industrial IoT, etc. can be implemented using EDC's integrated IoT architecture with low power
50 consuming and resource-constrained devices. Data collection and secure transfer are the important aspects
51 of such architectures implemented in critical applications. Many security algorithms exist which involve
52 both symmetric and asymmetric cryptography techniques, due to the lower power and computational
53 resources at IoT systems symmetric encryption is widely adopted that performs 1000 times better than
54 asymmetric cryptography (Puthal et al., 2017). Symmetric key encryption is less secure and cannot be
55 used for non-repudiation of the devices connected to the network. As the same shared key is used for
56 both encryption and decryption, it can be argued the receiver itself encrypted the message making device
57 authentication not possible. In a typical IoE architecture, the cloud layer is an integral part that is capable
58 of processing large amounts of data with larger computational power (Mukhopadhyay et al., 2021). Cloud
59 services utilized in architecture form a centralized system and can introduce issues like latency and Single
60 Point of Failure (SPOF).

61 The cryptography operations performed during the communication, and the central entity can be replaced
62 by leveraging a blockchain which can resolve the requirements of a central authority for reaching a
63 consensus among the distributed participants. The main component of blockchain is a decentralized ledger
64 which is used to store the data and timestamped transactions chronologically between the un-trusted
65 distributed entities. Every entity participating in a P2P network has a copy of the entire or part of the ledger.
66 A special type of node called miners present in the P2P network are responsible for validating transactions
67 and performing consensus before storing them in the immutable ledger. A blockchain is cryptographically
68 anchored and tamper-proof and is a record of the different transactions that occurred among the participants
69 in the network (Puthal et al., 2018).




Figure 1. Block generation, validation and addition in general Blockchain. Flames represent the resource intensive tasks during the process.

70 A central entity is not present in a blockchain architecture and a consensus algorithm is used to secure the
 71 distributed ledger and maintain consensus among the nodes in the network (Zyskind et al., 2015; Qu et al.,
 72 2021). A cryptographic hash is used to connect the previous blocks to the new blocks in the distributed
 73 ledger. This helps secure the ledger from anyone tampering with the transactions. Some widely used
 74 blockchain consensus algorithms are Proof-of-Work (PoW), Proof-of-Stake (PoS), and Proof-of-Activity
 75 (PoA). But the existing algorithms require high computational capabilities and resources which are not
 76 available in IoT architectures.

77 The process of block generation is shown in Fig. 1. The figure shows the process which requires high
 78 power and resources during the block validation and addition. The devices form blocks with multiple
 79 transactions and broadcast to the network. The miners in the network will validate the transactions, which
 80 consumes more power and requires high resources. Once the transactions are validated, the reverse hash of
 81 the block is calculated, which requires high resources. Local storage of the devices is also a bottleneck in the
 82 case of IoT architectures. All these issues are addressed in the proposed Proof-of-Authentication (PoAh),
 83 a lightweight blockchain consensus algorithm for IoT architectures. The current paper also implements
 84 a blockchain called EasyChain which operates on a PoAh consensus mechanism and can be seamlessly
 85 integrated into IoT.

86 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses contributions and novel solutions
 87 proposed from current work. Section 3 discusses the blockchain as a security primitive for the IoE. Section
 88 4 surveys existing consensus mechanisms and their adaptability to IoE cyber-physical systems. Section 5
 89 discusses insights into the proposed EasyChain and its software architecture. Section 6 describes the access
 90 control mechanism implemented for the proposed EasyChain. Section 7 discusses the novel consensus

91 protocol Proof-of-Authentication (PoAh) proposed in EasyChain. Section 8 presents experimental evaluation
92 and validation of the proposed EasyChain. Section 9 includes a discussion on different claims of the
93 proposed PoAh consensus algorithm followed by Section 10 concludes the paper and presents possible
94 future research.

2 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS WORK

95 2.1 Problem Definition

96 An estimated 18 billion devices will be connected to the network across the globe. The majority of the
97 connected devices will be sensors and other smart devices constantly monitoring the environment (Novo,
98 2018; Huang et al., 2017). Blockchain is one of the most promising solutions to be integrated into IoT for
99 decentralized security. It is predicted that a blockchain can:

- 100 • Maintain the device authentication and immutability (Nayak and Dutta, 2017).
- 101 • Maintain the integrity of data collected by IoT devices making it difficult to tamper with the data added
102 to the ledger (Kshetri, 2017).
- 103 • Decentralize the nodes making them more reliable and scalable (Nayak and Dutta, 2017).
- 104 • Leverage edge computing paradigm to provide near real-time data operations in the distributed network.
- 105 • Ensure an adversary-free network and eliminates false data injection in the network by providing
106 device authentication which can be a major contribution to healthcare systems.
- 107 • Robust and fine-grained access control mechanism for accessing processed data from networks.

108 The requirements of an IoT architecture differ from those of cryptocurrencies making the integration
109 difficult. Multiple issues must be addressed in the blockchain IoT integration (Wang and Malluhi, 2019):

- 110 • Time taken to validate and add the block to the ledger (Xin et al., 2017).
- 111 • Improved infrastructure to support high bandwidth for IoT devices (Kuzmin, 2017).
- 112 • Ensuring power-constrained consensus models to be deployed into IoT architectures.
- 113 • Easy integration to existing IoT architectures that can help in wide adoption.
- 114 • Easy-to-use functions reducing the computation requirements at the device level to generate blockchain
115 transactions.

116 Researchers in academic and industry areas are focusing more on integrating blockchain to IoT archite-
117 ctures due to the promise of solving security and data integrity issues of IoT (Ouaddah et al., 2016; Novo,
118 2018). This paper presents one such blockchain solution for IoE architecture with a novel lightweight
119 consensus algorithm. The proposed solution can be easily integrated into resource-constrained IoT systems
120 along with providing both data and device security.

121 2.2 Proposed Novel Solution

122 Integrating a blockchain consensus algorithm into an IoT architecture is a highly challenging task due
123 to the resource-constrained devices in the IoT network. But IoT devices are deployed in environments
124 where they are not constantly monitored. So, IoT can benefit from a decentralized network and consensus
125 algorithm provided by the blockchain. As a solution, a lightweight consensus algorithm, PoAh is presented
126 in the paper and a blockchain along with EasyChain which integrates the PoAh into an IoE architecture is
127 also proposed. Novel aspects of the proposed blockchain are as follows:

- 128 • PoAh adds a cryptographic authentication mechanism for both data and devices in the P2P network.
- 129 • EasyChain is proposed for resource-constrained real-time IoE architectures.
- 130 • Proposed blockchain mechanism EasyChain can serve requirements for private blockchain solutions.
- 131 • A robust access control mechanism adaptable in private use cases is proposed.
- 132 • Proposed EasyChain is evaluated as a solution for different use cases related to IoT healthcare systems.
- 133 • Finally, EasyChain is validated with both simulated and experimental setups using a real-time test bed
- 134 for performance evaluation.

3 BLOCKCHAIN AS A SECURITY PRIMITIVE FOR IOE

135 There have been many applications and architectures of IoT since the term was first coined. IoT architectures
136 were widely adopted across diverse areas including Smart Cities, Industries, Home automation, and Smart
137 Healthcare (Misra et al., 2021). Among these applications, the IoT has the most potential in solving many
138 issues in the Healthcare industry. Many smart healthcare IoT architectures were designed and deployed
139 across the world. This also helps in monitoring patient health remotely and administering the drugs if
140 necessary. IoT in the smart healthcare industry handles data related to patients. Things constantly monitor
141 the patients and transmit the data to the cloud (Kumar et al., 2020; Shahzad and Kim, 2019). Privacy
142 and security of such data must be given the highest priority. There are many threats possible in an IoT
143 environment, and in specific, healthcare. A simple threat can potentially endanger the life of a patient.
144 Many smart applications can be potentially targeted by the attackers to gain access to a household, through
145 a patient tracking device or access patient data (Hassija et al., 2019).

146 An access attack or an advanced persistent threat (APT) can grant the attacker access to the IoT network
147 (Hassija et al., 2019). Detecting the attacker in the network is challenging once the attack is successful
148 and grants access, information in the network can be stolen by the attacker. The wearable or implantable
149 devices present in the network constantly transmit the data to the cloud storage which can be monitored
150 by the attackers. A data transit attack is another vulnerability through which an attacker can gain access
151 to the data being transmitted to the storage. Another potential issue with IoT applications is the power
152 supply. Implantable Medical Devices (IMD) are required to work for long periods of time before requiring
153 a battery change. IoT architectures used in such applications must be designed with low power-consuming
154 devices and protocols. There are also many attacks that can potentially drain the battery of an IoT device
155 by running an injected code in a loop (Hassija et al., 2019). Blockchain can be a potential solution for
156 such issues mentioned above. Table 1 presents such challenges present in the IoT architectures and how
157 blockchain can act as a potential solution for such challenges.

4 RELATED PRIOR WORKS

158 As one size doesn't fit all, different consensus protocols are proposed for various applications. The most
159 commonly used consensus protocol is Proof-of-Work (PoW) which works based on the hashcash CPU
160 cost-function proposed in (Back, 2002). In this consensus protocol, different nodes in the network race
161 to solve a cryptography hash function to find the right nonce. Node finding the right nonce will be
162 given the opportunity to add a new block for which incentives will be awarded. PoW is widely used in
163 cryptocurrencies, however high computational requirements make it not suitable for resource-constrained
164 IoT environments.

Table 1. Blockchain as Potential Solution for IoT Challenges.

Category	Challenges in IoT Architectures	Blockchain as a Potential Solution
Privacy and Security in IoT architecture	Data stored on IoT devices is vulnerable to attacks.	A secure blockchain can store the data anonymously and maintain privacy.
	Data can be spoofed in IoT devices.	Device authentication consensus algorithms can be used to secure the IoT environments.
Computational	“Things” in an IoT environment are not computationally intensive.	All the computations in blockchain are offloaded to miners or trusted nodes.
Power	IoT devices are deployed in remote locations possibly operating on a battery.	Blockchain increases the security and privacy of the environment and offloads computations to the trusted nodes and miners which reduces power load on battery.
Form factor	IoT devices in some cases are required to be smaller.	In blockchain enabled IoT architectures, the “things” only has the sensors and communication module reducing the overall form factor of the devices.

165 Proof-of-Stake (PoS) (King and Nadal, 2012) is another popular consensus mechanism next to PoW
 166 which mainly uses the amount of stake and coin age as the parameters to choose the miner instead of the
 167 computational capacity like PoW. This removes the need for high computational requirements and increases
 168 the throughput of the network. However, like PoW, PoS is more popular in cryptocurrency networks, but
 169 the concept of stake is not relevant for IoT systems. Delegated Proof-of-Stake (DPoS) which is a variant of
 170 PoS is proposed in the BitShares project. In DPOS a certain number of witnesses or block producers are
 171 selected by the user votes. Users pool their tokens in a staking pool and elect a delegate to participate in the
 172 block production on their behalf. The transaction reward received will be distributed among the winning
 173 delegate and users who elected the delegate. It is based on the reputation of the node and like PoS works
 174 on the principle of stakes. Even though DPOS is faster than PoW and PoS, it is more centralized, and
 175 dependency on monetary aspects makes it not a good candidate for IoT systems. Proof-of-Importance (PoI)
 176 is a variant of PoS in which the winning node is selected based on reputation computed using multiple
 177 factors like the number of transactions validated correctly along with the staking coins. NEM blockchain
 178 (NemProject, 2018) uses the PoI consensus mechanism. Like PoS and DPoS, PoI also depends on stakes.

179 Proof-of -Elapsed Time (PoET) is another consensus protocol proposed by Intel in Hyperledger Fabric
 180 (Olson et al., 2018). It performs the same operations as PoW but the winning node is chosen based on the
 181 expiration of time allocated to that node instead of resource-intensive problems. Random wait time values
 182 will be assigned to each node through Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). Even though it provides
 183 higher throughput but as it is specially designed for private networks, the mechanism is making the network
 184 centralized and heavily depends on Intel tools like Software Guard Extensions (SGX).

185 Proof-of-Activity (PoA) is a combination of PoW and PoS. In the first step, miners will perform a
 186 complex cryptography puzzle to create a blank template block with only header information and mining
 187 reward address, and doesn't have any transactions. In the later step, PoS mechanism is applied to find the
 188 validators to check the block and add it to the network. Once a valid block is added, transactions will be
 189 recorded onto the newly created block. PoA has high energy consumption and latency which makes it not a
 190 viable solution for IoT systems.

191 Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) consensus protocol proposed in (Castro, 1999) to solve
 192 Byzantine General Problem (Lamport et al., 1982) in a distributed system. In this consensus protocol, all
 193 the nodes are ordered to form a primary or leader node and secondary or backup nodes and participate in
 194 the consensus mechanism. The goal of PBFT is to reach a consensus in the network even with a certain
 195 threshold of malicious nodes participating in the network. This threshold must be not greater or equal to
 196 one-third of the nodes in the network. Although it is robust, it doesn't provide scaling for large networks
 197 like IoT systems and results in large network overhead. Different variations of PBFT are also proposed
 198 Multi-Layer PBFT (Li et al., 2021) which significantly reduces the network overhead with the increase
 199 in layers but sacrificing the latency requirement. Federated Byzantine Fault Tolerance (FPBFT) which is
 200 used in Stellar Consensus Protocol proposed in (Mazieres, 2015). Ripple Consensus protocol in (Chase
 201 and MacBrough, 2018) works on low latency Byzantine Fault Tolerance mechanism to improve the latency
 202 and reach consensus even before a full agreement of the network.

203 Proof-of-Vote (PoV) proposed in (Li et al., 2017) is designed for consortium blockchain and works based
 204 on the decentralized arbitration of votes. Proof-of-Trust is another protocol proposed in (Zou et al., 2018)
 205 which selects the validators based on the trust values of the participants and makes use of RAFT leader
 206 election and Shamir's secret sharing algorithms to reach consensus.

207 A credit-based PoW mechanism is proposed in (Huang et al., 2019) which performs PoW and the
 208 difficulty of the puzzle changes dynamically based on the honesty of the node. With the honest node, the
 209 PoW puzzle takes less time compared to the node with dishonesty. Another reputation-based consensus
 210 Proof-of-Reputation-X (PoRX) (Wang et al., 2020) considers the nodes as per the positive contributions
 211 provided thereby reducing the need for ASIC mining and consuming less power.

Table 2. Comparative perspective of PoAh with other related works.

Consensus Algorithm	Blockchain Type	Mining	Prone To Attacks
Proof-of-Work(PoW)(Back, 2002)	Permission-Less	Based on Computational Power	Bribe attack, Sybil attack, 51% attack
Proof-of-Stake(PoS)(King and Nadal, 2012)	Permission-Less	Validation	DoS, Sybil attack, Nothing at stake
Ripple (Chase and MacBrough, 2018)	Permissioned	Vote Based Mining	DoS attack, Sybil attacks
Proof-of-Vote(PoV)(Li et al., 2017)	Consortium	Vote Based Mining	-
Proof-of-Trust(PoT)(Zou et al., 2018)	Permissioned	Probability and Vote Based Mining	DDoS attack
Proof-of-Reputation-X (PoRX) (Wang et al., 2020)	Permission-Less	Reputation Based	-
Proof-ofAuthentication(PoAh)(Current Paper)	Permissioned	Authentication	Currently Testing




Figure 2. Proposed Blockchain can have applications in various IoT driven systems.

5 THE PROPOSED NOVEL BLOCKCHAIN - EASYCHAIN

212 The proposed blockchain architecture uses the novel PoAh consensus algorithm. PoAh consensus algorithm
 213 authenticates the devices that are transmitting the data to the network and adds the respective data to the
 214 blockchain. PoAh is also significantly better compared to the existing consensus algorithms in various
 215 aspects such as latency, scalability, and power consumption. There are three major entities in the PoAh:
 216 the trusted node, the client node, and the storage node. The trusted node, as the name suggests, is a node
 217 from the network of trusted devices that is responsible for authenticating the other devices. The client
 218 nodes are in the field, or at the user end collecting the information. Storage nodes are devices with large
 219 storage capabilities which will store the entire trail of transactions in the network as the client and trusted
 220 nodes have limited storage capabilities. Fig. 2 shows a scenario of the proposed blockchain by taking
 221 the Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) as a use case. As shown in the figure, the patient data is being
 222 collected by IoMT devices. The patient's location or state does not constrain the blockchain. The patient
 223 can be at their home, a care facility, a hospital or transported in a vehicle. In all these scenarios, the patient
 224 is constantly monitored by the IoT devices, and the data is transmitted to the P2P network using PoAh
 225 consensus algorithm

226 The IoMT devices that are with the patient are the client nodes. The requirements of an IoMT device
 227 to act like a client device in PoAh are basic cryptographic functionality and communication capabilities.
 228 These two functionalities are available in most off-the-shelf components currently. The client node monitors
 229 the patient's vitals and constantly transmits the data to the trusted nodes network. Resource-constrained
 230 client nodes do not have the necessary memory to store the complete blockchain. As designed, EasyChain
 231 performs data transactions, so there is no need for the client nodes to store the entire trail of previous
 232 transactions, in contrast to financial applications where double spending must be verified. With only limited
 233 memory, client nodes can store only the most recent transactions.

234 The devices in the trusted node network are responsible for authenticating both client node device and
 235 the transaction data sent by the client node. The trusted node network has access to the identities of the




Figure 3. Software Architecture of Proposed EasyChain.

236 client devices present in the network. An off-the-shelf single-board computer can be used as a trusted node.
 237 As the proposed EasyChain is designed for private networks, the participating distributed entities in the
 238 system will initialize some of the participating nodes as trusted nodes by assigning a trust value greater
 239 than the threshold. Trust values are updated based on each block authentication, as discussed in Section 7

240 Storage nodes in the network have large storage capabilities compared to trusted or client nodes. As the
 241 transactions accumulate, the size of the data increases, and handling such large amounts is not possible
 242 with resource-constrained single-board computers. Storage nodes help in retaining the information of
 243 entire transactions and data trail which is helpful in accessing information from the network. Multiple
 244 storage nodes are deployed and maintained by distributed entities in the network. In a healthcare setup
 245 these entities can be a network of hospitals, Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Electronic Health Record
 246 (EHR) systems, etc. As the data is available at multiple locations, the proposed architecture is resistant to
 247 SPOF and achieves higher system availability.

248 Once the blocks are added to the blockchain it gets transmitted to the storage nodes. A nurse practitioner
 249 or a doctor can access the data from the storage nodes. This makes it easier for the doctor to monitor
 250 the patient's vitals remotely with very low latency. The blocks take around 400 milliseconds to get
 251 authenticated and added to the blockchain with high traffic. This ensures low-latency transactions and
 252 makes it easier for the doctor to access patient data. The patient's vitals can be assessed by the doctor while
 253 transported to the hospital in an ambulance and develop a treatment strategy accordingly. The proposed
 254 EasyChain mechanism can be divided into three steps: Initial registration of the client nodes, Generation
 255 and processing of transactions, and a Robust access control mechanism to ensure secure access to patient
 256 data. The software architecture of the proposed EasyChain is shown in Fig. 3.

Algorithm 1 Registration of New Nodes Into EasyChain Network

Input: Each Node will have its identity associated with MACID, Source ID and their own assigned Private ($P\gamma K$) and Public keys (PvK). Port number ($Port_{num}$) at which the client application is running.

Output: Node list at all the network nodes will be updated with newly added node.

```

1: for Every New incoming node N into network do
2:   A unique source ID (SID) which is random and unique to this node is generated.
3:   RSA Public key ( $PvK_N$ ) and Private Keys ( $P\gamma K_N$ ) are generated and assigned to this node.
4:   Private Key generated  $P\gamma K_N \leftarrow \text{rsa.generateNewKey}(\text{public exponent, key size})$ 
5:   Public Key generated  $PvK_N \leftarrow P\gamma K_N.\text{getPublicKey}()$ 
6:   RSA Private  $P\gamma K_N$  and public  $PvK_N$  keys are persisted in client node secure storage location.
7:   Public key file  $\leftarrow \text{writePublicKey}(PvK_N, \text{fileName})$ 
8:   Private key file  $\leftarrow \text{writePrivateKey}(P\gamma K_N, \text{fileName})$ 
9:   New node is registered and broadcast to all network nodes
10:  registerAndBroadcastNode( $Port_{num}, \text{MACID}, \text{SID}, PvK_N$ )
11:  for Each Node  $N_i$  in Existing Node List do
12:    Node list of  $N_i$  is updated with new node information
13:     $\text{NodeList}_i.\text{append}(\text{Node}_N(\text{Port}_{num}, \text{MACID}, \text{SID}, PvK_N))$ 
14:  end for
15:   $\text{NodeList}_N \leftarrow \text{getNodeListOfExistingNodes}()$ 
16:  Run Consensus and copy the longest acceptable chain to new node N
17:  Chain for Node N  $\text{Chain}_N \leftarrow \text{getLongestAcceptedChain}()$ 
18:  Return SID
19: end for

```

257 During the initial step, every client node should register in EasyChain network. Each node in the network
258 is assigned unique private and public RSA cryptography keys. Assigned public key PvK_N and private
259 key $P\gamma K_N$ are stored at the secure file location of the client node. The client node will send MACID, and
260 a randomly generated unique id called Source ID (SID). A node list is maintained by each participating
261 node in the network, which helps in peer discovery for new nodes. Once all the existing nodes are updated
262 with the new node information, a copy of this node list from the existing node will also be copied to the
263 newly added node for the discovery of other existing nodes by **the new node**. Along with that, the chain
264 information is also copied to the new node N during the initialization/registration phase. Detailed steps of
265 new node registration into the network are shown in Algorithm 1

266 Once the client node is registered into the network, it can generate transactions and share data within the
267 network. The generated transaction from the edge client node will be hashed using the SHA-256 hashing
268 algorithm and is used to generate the digital signature using the private key of the edge client node. The
269 digital signature generated will then be appended to the transaction data along with the MACID. The digital
270 signature is used as the primary authentication step of the Proof-of-Authentication algorithm whereas
271 MACID is for secondary authentication. Once the transaction is created by the edge client node, it will
272 be broadcast to the entire network and will be added to the pool of unconfirmed transactions. Trusted
273 nodes in the network will pick up the transactions which are yet to be confirmed from the unconfirmed
274 transaction pool. The trusted node then computes the hash of transaction data using the same hashing
275 algorithm (SHA-256) and using the public key of transacting node hash which is retrieved from the digital
276 signature. Both these hashes are then compared to check the integrity and non-reputability of the message.
277 This ensures the transaction data is coming from the genuine node and none of the malicious entities were
278 able to modify the data when communicating over the network. If the hashes match, then the trusted node
279 performs secondary authentication on the transaction by comparing the MACID sent from the edge device.
280 When MACID verification is successful, a random proof-of-authentication nonce which is a random value

Algorithm 2 Transaction Generation in EasyChain

Input: All the edge nodes in the network will have their assigned Private ($P\gamma K_e$) and Public keys (PvK_e).

Output: New block is generated and added to the chain.

```

1: for  $t_i$  time interval do
2:   Transaction  $Trx$  is generated by edge client node ( $e$ ) including processed information data  $I_e$ .
3:    $Trx \leftarrow createTransaction(I_e)$ 
4:   Metadata is added to the transaction  $Trx$ 
5:    $Trx \leftarrow Trx.append(Metadata)$ 
6:   SHA-256 algorithm is used to compute the hash.
7:   Digital Signature is generated by using private key of the edge node  $e$ .
8:    $D_{sign} \leftarrow P\gamma K_e(SHA - 256(Trx))$ 
9:   MAC address of the edge client node  $e$  is appended to the transaction and block is generated.
10:  Block  $B_e \leftarrow Trx^+.appendHeader(D_{sign}, MAC)$ 
11:  Prepared Block  $B_e$  is then published to the entire network
12:  Generated transaction is then added to the unconfirmed pool before being picked by the trusted node
   for consensus steps.
13:  Based on trust value threshold ( $\theta$ ) a trusted node ( $V$ ) is chosen from the trusted node list  $\langle List \rangle$ 
   nodes
14:  Primary authentication is performed by the chosen trusted node  $V$  on digital signature with public
   key of the source client node.
15:   $DecryptedMessageHash(MD_{dec}) \leftarrow Decrypt(D_{sign}, PvK_e)$ 
16:   $ComputedMessageHash(MD_{com}) \leftarrow SHA - 256(receivedtransaction(Trx^+))$ 
17:  if  $MD_{dec} == MD_{com}$  then
18:    Secondary authentication is performed on the MACID of the transacting node.
19:    if  $B_e.MACID == NodeListOfVerifyingNode.getMACID(B_e.SID)$  then
20:      Random Proof-of-Authentication nonce is generated and appended to the block before
      broadcasting to the network of nodes.
21:      Confirmed transaction is removed from the unconfirmed pool.
22:    else
23:      Ignore the block
24:      Unauthenticated transaction is removed from the unconfirmed pool.
25:    end if
26:  else
27:    Ignore the block
28:    Unauthenticated transaction is removed from the unconfirmed pool.
29:  end if
30: end for

```

281 generated by the trusted node is appended to the block and is published to the entire network. Detailed
 282 steps of the generating transaction and creation of blocks are shown in Algorithm 2.

283 There are multiple types of hashing algorithms, but the most used are Message Digest 5 (MD5), Secure
 284 Hashing Algorithm (SHA) 1 and 2, and the SHA-3 candidate called Keccak. SHA-256 produces a 256-bit
 285 hash and provides more collision resistance as opposed to MD5 which produces 128-bit output. Even
 286 though the performance of SHA-256 is slightly slower compared to MD5, it does not significantly impact
 287 the application and provides better security. A comparison of other lightweight hashing functions is done
 288 in (Alfrhan et al., 2021) which has shown SHA-256 requires fewer computations compared to keccak and
 289 PHOTON hash functions. Hence, SHA-256 is chosen as an optimal choice in the proposed EasyChain
 290 application.

Algorithm 3 Proposed Access Control Algorithm for EasyChain

Input: PKI system assigns requester with its own public key PvK_d and private key $P\gamma K_d$

- 1: Requester creates a request transaction along with the timestamp TS at which request is generated
- 2: $TX_{req}.append(\text{dataRequestInformation}, TS)$
- 3: $Req_{hash} \leftarrow \text{SHA-256}(TX_{req})$
- 4: $DigitalSign_{requester} \leftarrow Req_{hash}.encrypt(P\gamma K_d)$
- 5: $TX^+_{req} \leftarrow TX_{req}.append(DigitalSign_{requester})$
- 6: Publish the generated request to the network
- 7: $Requester.publish(TX^+_{req})$
- 8: **for** Every Data Request **do**
- 9: Retrieves public of the requester based on unique identifier assigned
- 10: $PvK_d \leftarrow \text{getPublicKey}(requesterID)$
- 11: Verify public key against the Access Control List (ACL) at the nodes
- 12: **if** PvK_d in ACL **then**
- 13: SHA-256 algorithm is used to compute the hash of the request
- 14: $ComputedHash \leftarrow \text{SHA-256}(TX_{reqdat})$
- 15: Digital sign appended is decrypted using the public key PvK_d of the requester
- 16: $SentHash \leftarrow DigitalSign_{requester}.Decrypt(PvK_d)$
- 17: Compare the SentHash and ComputedHash
- 18: **if** $ComputedHash == SentHash$ **then**
- 19: Check the timestamp whether it is within threshold δT
- 20: **if** $TS \geq TS - \delta t$ OR $TS \leq TS + \delta t$ **then**
- 21: Retrieve requested data from the storage nodes
- 22: $Req_{data} \leftarrow \text{retrieve}(TX_{hash})$
- 23: Send the retrieved data to the requester
- 24: $NetworkNode.publish(Req_{data})$
- 25: **else**
- 26: Discard the request
- 27: **end if**
- 28: **else**
- 29: Discard the request
- 30: **end if**
- 31: **else**
- 32: Discard the request
- 33: **end if**
- 34: **end for**

6 THE PROPOSED NOVEL ACCESS CONTROL MECHANISM FOR EASYCHAIN

291 The proposed PoAh-based EasyChain is designed for private networks in which only the authenticated
 292 clients will be able to participate and share the information. It is necessary that other response systems
 293 and primary care / Emergency personnel request data from the network. According to HIPPA, healthcare
 294 information of individuals should be given the utmost security and privacy. To implement such robust
 295 control access methodology, RSA keys are used to identify the requester before any information about the
 296 patients is provided. Nodes in the network, along with chain data also maintain an Access Control List
 297 (ACL) which will have all the public keys of the requester to which access has been granted. The timestamp
 298 of the transaction generated is also appended to the request for avoiding replay attacks. A threshold is
 299 defined, and the data request is only processed when a request is reached within the threshold defined.
 300 This will make the proposed access control mechanism immune to certain attacks like Replay attacks
 301 and Man-in-the-Middle attacks. Detailed steps of data access in the proposed EasyChain are shown in
 302 Algorithm 3.

303 To request data from the private network, the requester node creates a transaction with all the information.
304 A digital signature using the requester's private key is computed and appended to the request transaction
305 before sending it to the private blockchain. Access requests are picked up by one of the network nodes and
306 the public key of the requester is retrieved based on the unique id assigned to the requester. The retrieved
307 public key is then compared with the Access Control List (ACL) implemented at the nodes. Once the
308 requester access has been confirmed, the requester is authenticated based on the digital signature sent to
309 avoid malicious requests from adversaries. If the digital signature is verified, then only the requested data
310 is retrieved and sent back to the requester. In other cases, requests will be discarded thereby providing a
311 robust access control mechanism.

7 THE PROPOSED NOVEL CONSENSUS ALGORITHM - PROOF OF AUTHENTICATION

312 This section presents PoAh, a novel consensus algorithm proposed for a lightweight blockchain environ-
313 ment for IoT architectures. Unlike traditional consensus algorithms, PoAh validates the devices that are
314 generating the data during the mining process.

315 All the nodes or participants are connected to the same network and do not have a central entity managing
316 the workflow. All nodes in the network are IoT devices collecting environmental data through sensors. Each
317 node creates transactions with data collected from sensing. Multiple such transactions are collected to form
318 blocks and the block is broadcast to the nodes in the network for the authentication or mining process. The
319 rest of the process is where each consensus algorithm differs and consumes different resources based on
320 the algorithm. Consensus steps for PoW are shown in Figure 4a and Proof-of-Authentication in Figure 4b.
321 From Figure 4a, in the case of PoW all the miners in the network pick transactions from the unconfirmed
322 transaction pool and start the consensus mechanism to find the right nonce. Once one of the competing
323 miner nodes finds the right nonce and publishes a valid block to the network, all the miner nodes will
324 discard their working block and process restarts with a new block made from an updated unconfirmed
325 transaction pool thereby wasting the computational work performed by other miner nodes till then. Along
326 with that, hashcash problem of finding the right nonce is a highly power-consuming step in PoW. On the
327 other hand, the proposed PoAh as shown in Figure 4b picks the trusted node based on trust value which
328 performs the block validation with less resource-intensive digital signature and MACID check. Unlike in
329 PoW, selecting the trusted node based on trust value will also eliminate the wastage of computational work.

330 Blockchain ledger structure is compared between typical blockchain and the proposed EasyChain is
331 shown in Figure 5. Both transaction and block structures differ from the proposed EasyChain compared to
332 the typical blockchain. EasyChain transaction as shown in Figure 5b has source ID which is a unique ID
333 assigned at the time of client registration into the network, this unique Source ID is used by the trusted node
334 while validating the digital signature of transaction. Along with that, EasyChain is designed for performing
335 data transactions in an IoT environment, and transaction data resides in the corresponding data field in the
336 transaction. Unlike the block structure of PoW as shown in Figure 5a, PoAh doesn't perform the nonce
337 computations, and the fields for the nonce and target difficulty fields are eliminated in EasyChain block
338 structure.




Figure 4a. Proof-of-Work (PoW) consensus algorithm.




Figure 4b. Proposed Proof-of-Authentication (PoAh) consensus algorithm.

Figure 4. Proof-of-Work (PoW) compared to Proposed Proof-of-Authentication (PoAh)




Figure 5a. Block Structure in Typical Blockchain.




Figure 5b. Block Structure in Proposed EasyChain.

Figure 5. Typical Blockchain Ledger Structure compared to Blockchain Ledger of Proposed EasyChain.

339 A cryptographic inverse hash is calculated once the transactions are validated in the case of PoW
 340 consensus algorithm. Once the calculation is complete, the validated block is broadcast to the network of




Figure 6. Steps to select authenticated node for PoAh.

341 devices to add to their local blockchain ledger (Puthal and Mohanty, 2019). In the case of a PoS, a stake
 342 is first put by a miner. Based on the stake, the miners are randomly selected to mine the block (Puthal
 343 and Mohanty, 2019). Once the block mining is complete, it is broadcast to the network. These processes
 344 use high resources, and in some cases, Graphics Processing Units (GPU) for calculating the hash. These
 345 high-performance processors are not present on an IoT device.

346 PoAh is tailored for resource-constrained low-power, low-performance IoT devices. The network is
 347 initialized with a limited number of trusted nodes. The trusted nodes are considered secure devices
 348 introduced into the network with a trust value higher than zero, “ $tr > 0$ ”. The rest of the devices in the
 349 network are client nodes that are assigned a zero-trust value, “ $tr = 0$ ”. When a block of transactions is
 350 authenticated, the trust value is increased by a value of ‘1’, and if a fake block is authenticated, the trust
 351 value is decreased by ‘1’. There is a chance for the client nodes to identify the authenticated block to
 352 gain trust value. When a client node identifies the block authenticated by a trusted node, the trust value
 353 is increased by ‘ $tr=0.5$ ’. A client node can also identify a fake block which is authenticated by a trusted
 354 node to gain a trust value of ‘ $tr=1$ ’. If the trust value of the trusted node drops below the threshold ‘ $tr <$
 355 th ’, the device can lose its status as a trusted node. A threshold value of ‘5’ is considered in the PoAh
 356 implementation and a trust value of ‘10’ is assigned to the trusted nodes. Fig. 6 shows the process of
 357 selecting trusted node. Algorithm 4 shows the trust value management in proposed PoAh.

358 The client node collects the transactions and a source public key to form a block. It is then broadcast
 359 across the network. The trusted node receives the block and retrieves the source public key, y for validating
 360 the signature on the block. The validation process uses asymmetric cryptography with a public and private
 361 key for signature verification. A private key cannot be easily retrieved by the attacker. After the signature
 362 is verified, the trusted node evaluates the MAC address for a second round of authentication. Once the
 363 block is authenticated by the trusted node, it broadcast the block back to the network by adding a PoAh
 364 identifier where others add it to the local blockchain ledgers. Algorithm 5 shows the technical steps of
 365 PoAh consensus algorithm.

Algorithm 4 Trust value management in proposed PoAh consensus algorithm.

Input: Initialize the trust value of trusted nodes with a value of 10 and other network nodes with a value of 0.

Output: Updated trust value of the nodes.

```

1: for Selected trusted node  $N_{sel}$  with trust value  $tr_N$  that is greater than threshold  $th$ . do
2:   if Authenticated block then
3:     Authenticated block is broadcast to the network;
4:     if Client node  $N_{client}$  with trust value  $tr_{client}$  finds fake block then
5:        $tr_{client}++$ ; {Client nodes trust value increases by value 1}
6:        $tr_N--$ ; {Trusted node penalized by reducing trust value by 1}
7:       Trusted node status is revoked if new  $tr_N$  is less than threshold  $th$ ;
8:     else
9:       if Client node  $N_{client}$  with trust value  $tr_{client}$  performs block validation then
10:         $tr_{client}+0.5$ ; {Client nodes trust value increases by 0.5}
11:         $tr_N++$ ; {Selected trusted node trust value increases by 1}
12:      else
13:         $tr_N++$ ; {Only selected trusted node trust value increases by 1}
14:      end if
15:    end if
16:  else
17:     $tr_N--$ ; {Selected trusted node is not available}
18:    Trusted node status is revoked if new  $tr_N$  is less than threshold  $th$ ;
19:  end if
20:  Select new trusted node and GOTO (Step – 1);
21: end for

```

Algorithm 5 Procedure of PoAh consensus algorithm.

Input: *SHA* – 256 hash is used at all nodes. Every participant has private (*PrK*) and public keys (*PuK*).

Output: Authenticated Blocks that are added to the ledger.

```

1: ( $Trx^+$ )  $\rightarrow$  blocks; {Multiple transactions are combined to form blocks.}
2: ( $S_{PrK}$ )(block)  $\rightarrow$  broadcast; {Block is signed with private key and broadcast to the network.}
3: ( $V_{PuK}$ )(block)  $\rightarrow$  MAC Checking; {Trusted nodes authenticates the block with source public key}
4: if Authenticated then
5:    $block||PoAh(D)$   $\rightarrow$  broadcast; {Authenticated block is broadcast to network with trusted node signature}
6:    $H(block)$   $\rightarrow$  Add blocks into chain; {If block has trusted node signature, they add to block.}
7: else
8:   DROP the block; {If block is not authentic, it is discarded.}
9: end if
10: GOTO (Step – 1) for next block;

```

8 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATIONS

366 This section presents the simulation results of a large-scale study and a test-bench was designed for
 367 small-scale experimental results of the proposed Blockchain.

368 8.1 Simulation Evaluation

369 The proposed EasyChain is implemented using the Python programming language. An IoT System with
 370 4 nodes among which one node has been given a trust value greater than the threshold value to act as a
 371 validating node. For experimental setup, all nodes are implemented using the Raspberry Pi 4 Model B
 372 which is based on the Broadcom BCM2711 Quad-core Cortex-A72 (ARM v8) 64-bit SoC at 1.8GHz with
 373 4GB LPDDR4-3200 SDRAM. To quantify the computational capabilities of the node, OpenSSL is used




Figure 7. Cryptographic Digest Performance of Node with Varied Block Size and Digest Algorithm.




Figure 8. Proposed EasyChain Experimental Setup.

374 to perform benchmark tests to measure node cryptographic performance. A set of digest algorithms are
 375 selected for testing which includes MD5, SHA-256, and SHA3-256. Throughput results from the benchmark
 376 test can be seen in Figure 7. Experimental setup for implemented EasyChain is shown in Figure 8. As the
 377 data size used for simulation evaluation is small, one of the nodes with a 32GB SD Card acts as a storage
 378 node in the current experimental setup. If large amounts of storage are needed in real-time applications,
 379 an SSD can be interfaced with the Raspberry Pi 4 node through USB 3.0 port. Off-chain storage using
 380 Inter-planetary File System (IPFS) can also be implemented as a solution for data storage. RSA public
 381 cryptography system is used in EasyChain for encryption, digital signatures, and verifying the signatures.
 382 Block format for implemented EasyChain follows $\langle SourceID, DigitalSignature, Tx1, Tx2, \dots \rangle$.

383 Fig. 9 shows the ledger structure along with other chain information. Blockchain ledger consists of the
 384 mined blocks which are added to the chain along with pending transactions, registered network nodes, and
 385 their corresponding information like MAC address for PoAh secondary authentication.



Figure 9. Ledger Structure Showing Genesis Block for Implemented EasyChain.




Figure 10. Transaction Added to Unconfirmed Transaction Pool in EasyChain.

386 Sample monitoring data which consists of essential information like patient id, Body Temperature, Respi-
 387 ratory Rate, Saturated Oxygen level (SpO2), and Blood Pressure is used for performing the transactions
 388 from the client node. Before sending the patient data, the transaction is signed by the private key and the
 389 broadcast transaction will be added to the unconfirmed transaction pool at each network node. Added
 390 unconfirmed transaction can be seen in Fig. 10.

391 One of the trusted nodes in the network will pick up the transactions from the unconfirmed transaction
 392 pool and perform PoAh consensus. Once the consensus is reached, it will be added as a new block in the
 393 chain at every peer node and the corresponding transaction will be purged from the unconfirmed pool. The
 394 confirmed block is shown in Fig. 11.

395 **8.2 Performance Evaluation**

396 Transaction time and block generation times are analyzed to evaluate the performance of implemented
 397 EasyChain. Timestamps are generated at multiple checkpoints of block processing to record the time taken




Figure 11. Block Added to Chain after Performing Proposed PoAh Consensus by Trusted Node.




Figure 12. Time Taken for Client Node to Send Transaction to Trusted Node.

398 for the transaction to reach the trusted node and the time taken by the trusted node to perform the consensus
 399 mechanism and add a new block.

400 Timestamp t_{cp} is the time at which the client node has collected the data from the sensing elements and
 401 prepares a transaction whereas timestamp t_{tr} is the time taken for the client transaction to reach the trusted
 402 node. Client transaction time δ_{ct} is computed from these timestamps.

$$\delta_{ct} = t_{tr} - t_{cp} \tag{1}$$

403 100 transactions are performed from a client node in the implemented EasyChain and measured
 404 transaction times can be seen in Fig. 12.




Figure 13. Time Taken for Trusted Node to Generate a New Block.

Table 3. Transaction and Block Time in Implemented EasyChain.

	Client Node	Trusted Node
Minimum Time (ms)	8.34	141
Maximum Time (ms)	83.87	186
Average Time (ms)	23.09	148.89

405 Similarly, block generation time is measured from the timestamps recorded t_{tr} being time recorded when
 406 a transaction reached the trusted node and t_{tm} being the time at which the block is mined after performing
 407 PoAh consensus.

$$\delta_{tb} = t_{tm} - t_{tr} \quad (2)$$

408 Computed block generation times can be seen in Fig. 13. Minimum, Maximum, and Average times are
 409 computed and are shown in Table 3. We can see the minimum, maximum, and average transaction times
 410 for the client node are 8.34ms, 83.87ms, and 23.09ms respectively. Similarly, the minimum, maximum,
 411 and average block times of trusted nodes are 141ms, 186ms, and 148.9ms respectively.

412 8.3 Power Consumption

413 Another challenge for integrating blockchain into a resource-constrained IoT environment is power
 414 consumption. Implemented test-bed is evaluated for power consumption by using an electrical meter
 415 connected to the power outlet as shown in Fig. 14. Power is measured when both implemented systems are
 416 in an ideal state and when SBC is processing the data. Power consumed by the client node, trusted node,
 417 and storage nodes in both scenarios is shown in Table 4.



Figure 14. Electric Meter Setup for Measuring Power Consumption in Implemented EasyChain

Table 4. Power Consumption of Different Nodes in Implemented EasyChain.

	Client Node	Trusted Node	Storage Node
Max Power Consumption in Watts	1.8	2.5	3.6
Min Power Consumption in Watts	1.5	2	3.1

418 Power consumption of the client node is minimum at 1.5 Watts when SBC is in an idle state whereas it is
 419 maximum 1.8 Watts when collecting the information and performing the transaction. Similarly, the trusted
 420 node also consumed lower power of 2 Watts at idle state and 2.5 Watts when performing the consensus
 421 mechanism for the received transaction. Storage node consumes higher power compared to the other two
 422 types of nodes with power ranging from 3.1 Watts to 3.6 Watts. Power consumption is shown in Fig. 15.
 423 Comparison of proposed Proof-of-Authentication (PoAh) with some of the established protocols can be
 424 seen in Table 2.

9 DISCUSSION ON PROPOSED PROOF OF AUTHENTICATION CONSENSUS PROTOCOL

425 PoAh consensus algorithm authenticates the devices that are transmitting the data in contrast to other
 426 consensus algorithms such as PoW and PoS which validate only the transactions sent by the nodes. PoAh
 427 uses significantly less energy and resources which is suitable for resource-constrained IoT environments.
 428 In PoAh, the block has the patient data collected by the sensors, the identity of the device on the patient,
 429 and the timestamp when the block is generated. All the nodes are connected to the same network through
 430 a wired or wireless interface using IPv4. The MAC address is used as the identification for the devices
 431 during the block generation. Once the block is validated by the trusted nodes, it is broadcast to the network
 432 with the signature of the trusted node and other nodes add to their local blockchain ledger. The following
 433 claims are made in the paper to validate PoAh is scalable and suited for the IoE.

434 **Claim – 1:** Block validation in PoAh uses less resources.




Figure 15. Power Consumption of Different Nodes in EasyChain

435 **Discussion:** In the consensus algorithms such as PoW, to validate the transactions, the inverse hash of the
 436 block is calculated by the miners. This calculation is a resource-heavy process, which utilizes equivalent
 437 energy consumed by two households in a day (Zyskind et al., 2015). IoT environment has low-power
 438 low-performance devices that cannot perform such computationally intensive tasks. PoAh uses a device
 439 authentication mechanism to validate the nodes transmitting the data. Validating a signature consumes
 440 significantly less power and requires fewer resources compared to the calculation of inverse hash.

441 **Claim – 2:** Time taken to authenticate devices in PoAh is less without compromising security.

442 **Discussion:** In PoW, block validation takes 10 minutes and a new block is generated after that (Zyskind
 443 et al., 2015). In any IoE application, data collection and transmission cannot afford to spend 10 minutes for a
 444 new block generation. IoT devices are used to monitor the source at regular intervals. Device authentication
 445 in PoAh takes minimal time. Experimental evaluations show PoAh is 1,000 times faster than PoW (Dorri
 446 et al., 2017).

447 **Claim – 3:** A substantial blockchain based security is provided by PoAh.

448 **Discussion:** IoT applications deal with devices that send data in real time. So, a security primitive tailored
 449 for such an application is necessary. A cryptographic solution is a sufficient protection in the current
 450 proposed scenario, unlike the cryptocurrencies (Puthal et al., 2018). PoAh integrates the cryptographic
 451 security provided by PoW ignoring the block evaluation of computing the inverse of the hash. The issues in
 452 PoW, unstable network connectivity, and 51 % attack are addressed in the proposed consensus algorithm.
 453 All devices in the network are capable of data generation and trusted nodes authenticate the blocks and
 454 trusted peers (solves the 51% attack issue) can authenticate and add blocks into the chain.

455 **Claim – 4:** PoAh is a better consensus algorithm for IoT integration compared to the existing algorithms.

456 **Discussion:** A consensus algorithm is responsible for taking the decision to validate and add a block to
 457 the Blockchain ledger. Widely used consensus algorithms such as Proof of Work (PoW), Proof of Stake
 458 (PoS), and Proof of Authority (PoAu) are resource hungry and consume more power (Andoni et al., 2019).
 459 Block mining takes around 10 minutes in the case of PoW and around 1 hour to get accepted to the ledger.
 460 PoAh addresses such issues in the IoT architectures.

10 CONCLUSIONS

461 This paper provides EasyChain, a novel PoAh-based blockchain for the IoE. The proposed blockchain
462 does not have a centralized entity by building a lightweight security solution using PoAh. EasyChain is
463 validated using theoretical analysis, simulation, and a real-time experimental evaluation. The results show a
464 promising IoE integration of blockchain. The proposed algorithm can be deployed across multiple devices
465 and environments, when a patient is present in the hospital, at home, or in an ambulance as EasyChain
466 does not rely on a certain communication protocol.

467 As a future work, the framework can be extended to add multiple layers of security, adding a hardware-
468 assisted security module like Physical Unclonable Function modules to the proposed work. A user-friendly
469 GUI along with the blockchain explorer to check the status of the blockchain and retrieve transactions easily
470 will be implemented. Business logic implementation is difficult in the current EasyChain implementation
471 as it doesn't support smart contracts and to implement any business logic, the base code must be modified.
472 Easier integration of business logic will be the next step we will work on to further improve our proposed
473 EasyChain architecture.

COMPLIANCE WITH ETHICAL STANDARDS

474 The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest and there was no human or animal testing, or
475 participation involved in this research. All data were obtained from public domain sources.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

476 A preliminary version of this study has been presented at ICCE 2019 (Puthal et al., 2019). An extended
477 version of this work has been archived at (Puthal et al., 2020).

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